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Abstract
This paper argues for a position of ‘dark pessimism’ towards introspective reports 
playing a strong justificatory role in consciousness science, based on the application 
of frameworks and concepts of measurement. I first show that treating introspec-
tive reports as measurements fits well within current discussions of the reliability 
of introspection, and argue that introspective reports must satisfy at least a minimal 
definition of measurement in order to play a justificatory role in consciousness sci-
ence. I then show how treating introspective reports as measurements makes it pos-
sible to identify the foundational methodological problems that underlie much of the 
current philosophical and scientific debate about the status of introspective evidence 
in studying consciousness. I argue that these problems prevent introspective reports 
from playing a strong justificatory role and resolving long-standing debates in con-
sciousness science, both in contemporary work and in the future.
1 Introduction
Consciousness science does not currently make much use of introspective reports 
in a strong justificatory role; in particular they are not used to inform or provide 
empirical confirmation for theories of consciousness. For various researchers, both 
empirical and philosophical, this is a poor state of affairs, and they argue that intro-
spective evidence can provide necessary, unique, and potentially revolutionary data, 
poised to resolve long-standing debates in consciousness science concerning the 
boundaries and contents of subjective experience (Hurlburt 2011; Jack and Roep-
storff 2002; Kriegel 2013; Olivares et  al. 2015; Overgaard et  al. 2006a, b; Petit-
mengin 2006). This is set against a background where both supporters and detractors 
of introspection are aware of the problems associated with gathering veridical intro-
spective reports. Supporters of introspection claim that these problems must be, and 
can be, overcome, while detractors are more sceptical.
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This paper argues for a position of ‘dark pessimism’1 towards introspective 
reports playing a strong justificatory role in consciousness science, based on the 
application of frameworks and concepts of measurement. Introspective reports are 
not usually described as ‘measurements’, but these reports are after all attempts 
to veridically and publically record the properties of experience, sometimes using 
pre-set rating scales or response categories. Discussions of introspective evidence 
often focus on questions of variability, validity, and accuracy, all of which are basic 
features of any measure. Discussions of introspective reports also often mention 
training or calibration of introspective participants, validation of methods, and so 
on. Linking introspective reports with frameworks of measurement is therefore not 
totally alien.
At the same time however, the use of this kind of vocabulary is distanced from 
any rigorous evaluation of introspective reports as measurements. Attempts at cali-
bration or validation are often local, as are resolutions to problematic instances of 
introspective variability or inaccuracy. As I argue below, the idea of introspection 
as measurement can in fact be used to illustrate and identify the deep methodologi-
cal problems that underlie much of the current debate about introspective evidence 
in consciousness science. These problems most obviously apply to the current state 
of affairs with respect to introspection, but I further argue that these problems pre-
vent introspective reports from ever playing a strong justificatory and decisive role 
in consciousness science.
The argument rests on evaluating the methodologies available to researchers to 
validate introspective procedures and reports. Compared to other uses of verbal 
reports in cognitive science, introspective reports about the nature of consciousness 
raise specific methodological challenges, related in particular to how unknown, how 
unpredictable, and how complex and sensitive the generation of introspective reports 
is, compared to other sources of evidence about consciousness. Analysing the steps 
required to use either ‘bottom-up’ bootstrapping methods or comparative techniques 
for validating introspective procedures or evidence shows that there are a number 
of reasons why introspective evidence cannot carry significant justificatory weight. 
Instead of introspective reports being able to resolve long-standing debates in con-
sciousness science, the methodology presented below suggests that these debates 
would have to be largely resolved before introspective reports could be appropriately 
validated. By this point though, introspective reports would no longer be able to pro-
vide an independent source of justification for theoretical claims about the nature of 
consciousness.
Below, Sect. 2 briefly identifies what introspective evidence is supposed to pro-
vide evidence about, and reviews recent arguments in favour of a strong justificatory 
role of introspective reports in consciousness science. This includes a discussion of 
the justificatory role of verbal reports in other areas of cognitive science, where I 
show that the methods used there are not transferrable to the case of consciousness. 
Section  3 motivates treating introspective reports as measurements and reviews 
1 A term used by Schwitzgebel in his (2011). The pessimism argued for here is in some ways darker than 
Schwitzgebel’s, and is motivated in a radically different way.
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existing discussions of introspection in terms of measurement. In Sect. 4 a ‘bottom-
up’ process for developing measurement procedures is outlined, and problems in 
applying this to introspection are identified. In Sect. 5 the possibility of cross-val-
idating introspective procedures is outlined and evaluated. Section 6 considers the 
cross-validation of sets of introspective evidence, and the evidentiary and justifica-
tory status of introspective reports that result within this framework. An objection to 
the scope of the argument is considered in Sect. 7, and Sect. 8 concludes.
2  The Role of Introspective Reports
Within consciousness science there is currently a lot of interest in the role of subjec-
tive data, and introspective reports in particular, in understanding the nature of expe-
rience. For the purposes of this paper, this mostly concerns identifying where the 
boundary between conscious (experienced) and unconscious (not experienced) per-
ception is, and what its contents are (e.g. is subjective experience ‘rich’ or sparse’ 
in detail, Block 2007; Kouider et  al. 2010). Many, though not all, of the positive 
proposals for introspective reports playing a strong justificatory role for claims about 
these features of experience have come from philosophers and cognitive scientists 
influenced by the phenomenological tradition within philosophy (e.g. Gallagher and 
Sørensen 2006; Kriegel 2013; Lutz and Thompson 2003; Petitmengin 2006). How-
ever, there is still a general scepticism from cognitive scientists about the possible 
evidentiary roles of introspective reports (e.g. Schooler and Schreiber 2004), and 
there are philosophical sceptics too (Bayne and Spener 2010; Dennett 2003, 2007; 
Schwitzgebel 2008, 2012).
The basis of the positive proposals is that introspective evidence is simply a nec-
essary form of evidence for developing theories of consciousness (subjective experi-
ence), so methods with appropriate safeguards must be developed to try to use it. 
There is an accompanying optimism about the ability of such methods to uncover at 
least some veridical introspective reports, and there are concrete proposals for what 
these methods might look like.
A clear statement of this approach comes from Kriegel (2013), who puts forward 
an argument for the ‘epistemic indispensability’ of introspective reports. He argues 
that it would be strange to conduct a study of zebras based entirely on indirect 
observations of zebras (zebra tracks, droppings, etc.) if it was possible to directly 
observe them. Similarly, given that we have direct (observational) access to our own 
experiences via introspection, it would be bizarre to develop theories of conscious-
ness without making use of this evidence. A further claim is that since introspec-
tive reports are likely to be more veridical than not, in at least some circumstances 
(under normal conditions, from normal subjects, not aimed at ‘elusive phenomenol-
ogies’), we should be making use of introspective reports.
Kriegel further specifies that the role that introspective reports should play is a 
justificatory role, rather than a role in discovery. Researchers regularly use intro-
spection, both applied to themselves, and introspective reports from subjects, to 
develop hypotheses and non-introspective experiments to test these hypotheses. 
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Kriegel’s claim is that introspective reports, adequately gathered and properly con-
trolled, should play a justificatory role too.
On the face of it, this claim seems entirely reasonable. After all, verbal reports 
of inner states regularly play a justificatory role in some areas of cognitive science, 
and while not without critics, they can be well validated and informative. Despite 
the oft cited Nisbett and Wilson (Nisbett and Wilson 1977) study suggesting that 
subjects’ reports about decision making should not be trusted, Ericsson and Simon 
(1980, 1993) generated a framework that is still being used (with modification) for 
using verbal reports to gain data about thought processes in problem solving. The 
main two procedures are ‘thinking aloud’ and ‘talking aloud’ during the completion 
of a cognitive task, but the application of these procedures are limited to avoid meth-
odological pitfalls (as found in the Nisbett and Wilson study).
First, these procedures are limited to cases where one can theoretically motivate 
the idea that task performance relies on complex thought that takes a form similar to 
inner speech. In this case verbal reports are outward expressions of existing (verbal-
ised) thoughts; they make public, in a fairly straightforward way, what was private. 
In cases where the verbal report goes beyond this task-related inner speech, such 
as when subjects are asked to carefully explain their task strategy, such reports are 
likely to distract attention away from the main task and as a result subjects are less 
likely to generate accurate reports (e.g. they may confabulate). Second and relatedly, 
the general validity of the procedures can be tested by seeing whether generating a 
verbal report during a task changes task performance or task-related memory. If gen-
erating a verbal report alters task performance, this shows that to produce the report, 
subjects are engaging in additional cognitive processing to that directed at the main 
task. This in turn threatens the accuracy of the verbal report. Third, these proce-
dures are limited to tasks where there is a right answer (e.g. mental arithmetic). The 
validity of subjects’ verbal reports about their thought processes can be tested by 
comparing their reports with features of their task performance (accuracy, reaction 
times, eye movements) and sets of alternative possible cognitive strategies (via task 
analysis). Mismatches between reports and task performance suggest that the reports 
are inaccurate.
These three constraints seem to rule out safely using verbal reports to learn about 
the properties of experience. In particular, the focus of these constraints is on avoid-
ing subjects engaging in ‘reactive’ cognitive processing, where the task of generat-
ing verbal reports changes the processes or states under investigation, and usually 
leads to the generation of inaccurate reports of these targets. This is a very famil-
iar problem from the case of introspection: here there is a significant question of 
whether engaging in introspection changes the experience itself, and so whether the 
introspective report accurately reflects experience. Accordingly, Ericsson (2003) 
rejects the justificatory value of studies where the possibility of reactive reports can-
not be ruled out, and where ‘open-ended’ introspection is used. He is however sup-
portive of these reports in playing a role in generating testable hypotheses:
…introspecting subjects are instructed to engage in additional observation 
and noticing. Which aspects of the cognitive processes and for how long these 
aspects are observed are likely to be unpredictable to both the subjects and the 
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experimenter. As a consequence, the traditional methods of validation….will 
not be available as tools for the analysis of open-ended introspective reports. 
This type of introspective report can still provide valuable opinions and ideas 
that might lead to the generation of interesting and more targeted hypotheses. 
(Ericsson 2003, p. 16)
Therefore this approach, while supportive of the justificatory role of verbal reports 
in some limited contexts, works against optimism about introspective reports being 
able to play a methodologically robust role in justifying claims in consciousness sci-
ence. Indeed, it is this inability to use standard methods of validation, combined 
with a lack of knowledge of how introspective reports about consciousness are gen-
erated that causes endless problems in consciousness research.
Similarly, in reply to Kreigel’s optimistic claims about the widespread veridical-
ity of introspection, Schwitzgebel (2013; see also Spener 2013) questions in just 
what conditions we can take introspective reports to be more likely veridical than 
not, and what counts as an elusive phenomenology. One worry is that most instances 
of introspection will not generate reports that are more likely to be veridical than 
not, since most instances of introspection are not done under ‘normal’ conditions 
(which need specification), and because many features of our experiences are elu-
sive. A related worry is that we (as yet) have little idea under what conditions intro-
spective reports are likely to be veridical, but that these conditions may be both very 
complex and very limiting. This paper is an attempt to rigorously address these wor-
ries and to see how substantial they are, by further analysing introspection as a form 
of measurement.
3  Introspection as Measurement
First, despite the preceding discussion it may initially sound odd to treat intro-
spection about conscious experiences as a form of measurement, and introspec-
tive reports as measurements of properties of conscious states. While introspective 
reports may form one way of ‘capturing’ and making public certain aspects of expe-
rience, it is not immediately clear that this amounts to measurement, or what it is 
that is being measured in particular cases.
However, measurement can be thought of in a minimal way. At heart, measure-
ment is a method for identifying some aspect of an object or event, and labelling it 
according to some (publicly shared) format or metric. This minimal account does 
not make great demands of introspective reports about consciousness in order to be 
treated as measurements. And if introspective reports are to play a justificatory role 
in consciousness science, then they will have to satisfy this definition. Introspective 
reports that do not successfully identify some aspect of a conscious state, and which 
cannot be put in the form of a publicly shared format or metric, are of no scientific 
use. That is because if introspective reports do not tell us about the target phenom-
enon in some kind of publicly shared format, then they cannot be used to make com-
parisons and generalisations about instances of experience across subjects, and from 
here it is not clear what theoretical claims they could be used to justify or challenge. 
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In this case, if introspective reports are not measurements in this minimal sense, 
they cannot play a justificatory role in consciousness science.
Indeed, introspective reports of some kinds can be treated fairly straightforwardly 
as measurements of properties of conscious states. Introspective reports have been 
used to measure and compare properties of experience like the clarity, visibility, and 
brightness of different visual experiences, often using graded response scales or pre-
set response categories. This involves treating some target property of an experience 
as falling along a (linear) scale, where introspective reports label an experience as 
falling somewhere along this scale, with the hope that the reports can be used to 
order these experiences in terms of how well they exhibit the target property. The 
more methodologically rigorous experiments that use these kinds of introspective 
reports are also mindful of potential problems with the variability, calibration, and 
validity of the introspective reports that are generated.
Further, one of the very general discussions about introspective reports falls under 
the umbrella of measurement. This discussion stems from the unexpected degree of 
variation in introspective reports about conscious experiences across subjects, across 
time in the same subject, even under what one might consider controlled conditions, 
and what this means for the ‘trustworthiness’ of introspective reports.
For example, the variation in subjects’ reports for fairly simple perceptual tasks 
is well known in psychophysics (for classic treatment see Swets and Green 1966; for 
more recent framework see King and Dehaene 2014). In addition, using Hurlburt’s 
‘Descriptive experience sampling’ technique (e.g. Hurlburt and Schwitzgebel 2007), 
which includes a fair amount of post-experiment debriefing to control for possible 
subjective bias, there can still be a significant degree of variation in subjects’ reports 
about their experiences (Schwitzgebel 2007). Finally, Dennett (e.g. 1993, 2002) and 
Schwitzgebel (e.g. 2002a, b, 2008, 2012) have argued that we are sometimes radi-
cally inconsistent, and sometimes just plain wrong, when we report what things are 
like for us. This is argued to be true for a variety of phenomenal states, including 
visual experience, dreams, imagery, and emotional states, among others (for other 
examples see e.g. Bayne and Spener 2010).
Findings like these underlie attitudes of varying degrees of skepticism towards 
the veracity of introspective reports about consciousness across both philosophy and 
consciousness science. This is because they generate what Hohwy (2011) has called 
the ‘Argument from Variability’:
AV1: There is evidence of introspective variability across conditions and 
across subjects.
AV2: Introspective variability across conditions and subjects is best explained 
by introspection’s being unreliable.
So, by inference to the best explanation, introspection is unreliable. (p. 265)
Before proceeding however, and in order to make the core terms more clear, it 
helps to follow a standard framework for assessing measurement that includes 
reliability, validity, and accuracy (e.g. Carmines and Zeller 1979). Here, reliabil-
ity refers to the stability or repeatability of a measure when it is applied to (what 
we take to be) the same phenomenon under the same conditions. Validity refers to 
how well (or if) a measure targets what it is meant to, and not some other property 
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that perhaps correlates with the target. Accuracy refers to how well the measure 
reflects the phenomenon being measured; how fine-grained the measure is and 
what the measurement error is. In the literature on introspection ‘reliability’ is 
used to mean some combination of all of these, such that ‘reliable introspective 
reports’ are those that veridically describe properties of a subject’s experience. 
From now on, all uses of ‘reliability’ will follow measurement theory, so mean 
the repeatability of a measure.
As discussed in Chang (2004), testing whether a measure is reliable (repeat-
able) is a key step in establishing a measurement system. Whether a measure is 
reliable across the same conditions is the only property of a measurement that 
can be (more or less) directly observed; whether a measure is valid or accurate 
can only be inferred. As shown in Fig. 1, if a measure lacks reliability, this shows 
that the measure is either invalid or inaccurate. That is, if a measure of property P 
is not repeatable under conditions where it should be repeatable, then either this 
measure is measuring some other property Q, or it is an inaccurate measure of P. 
Unreliability, as in the Argument from Variability above, therefore highlights a 
problem with the measure. It is important to note that the mere presence of reli-





Fig. 1  This figure shows possible combinations of validity and reliability. Each ‘target’ contains a bulls-
eye, which represents the real value of the measured property. A measure is reliable if repeated measures 
(×) fall within the same small area on the target. A measure is valid if repeated measures are clustered 
around the bulls-eye. A measure is more accurate the closer the x’s are to the bulls-eye. a Shows an unre-
liable and also invalid measure. b Shows an unreliable but valid measure. c Shows a reliable but invalid 
measure. d Shows a measure that is both valid and reliable. Unreliable measures are either not valid (a) 
or inaccurate (b). However, reliable measures are not always valid (C)
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make the same pattern of errors) or that it is valid (it could measure some other 
variable that is correlated with the variable of interest). Nevertheless, analyz-
ing the reliability of a measure is an important step in analyzing a measurement 
procedure.2
Using this framework and terminology of measurement, the Argument from Vari-
ability above becomes:
AV1′: There is evidence of unreliability in introspective data across conditions 
and across subjects (there is variability where we don’t expect it).
AV2′: Given the framework of measurement, introspective unreliability across 
conditions and subjects is best explained by introspection either being inaccu-
rate (introspection is error-prone), or possibly invalid (introspective processes 
do not track properties of conscious experiences).
So, by inference to the best explanation, introspection is either inaccurate or 
invalid.
This problem is found in various guises in the literature on introspection, and is a 
fairly recognizable problem given the framework of measurement. There are various 
ways of dealing with it in particular cases (e.g. Hohwy 2011 offers one), discussed 
later.
There are also other more explicit discussions of measurement and instrumenta-
tion in relation to introspection. Piccinini (2003, 2009) introduced the idea of intro-
spective agents as ‘self-measuring instruments’. This was primarily done to rebut 
the claim that introspective data is private data, and thus not scientific data. Instead, 
introspective data is firmly public, and consists of recorded behaviours and verbal 
reports.
Piccinini further argues that, like with any other instrument or measurement pro-
cedure, making use of the introspective reports generated by these self-measuring 
agents demands careful experimental design and precise task instructions, calibra-
tion (perhaps via training), and careful interpretation. Piccinini notes that this focus 
on the agent as an instrument, and the experimenter as the observer, is consistent 
with the idea that experimenters can use and interpret data from an instrument with-
out knowing very much about how the instrument works, or about the phenomenon 
being measured (e.g. citing Hacking 1983). Instead, a skilled experimenter may be 
able to develop complex experimental protocols or interpretive frameworks with 
only the practical knowledge of the instrument gained in the lab. Given that there is 
currently very little scientific research on the process of introspection (see e.g. Over-
gaard et al. 2006a for a rare exception), this sounds promising.
However, Feest has argued that using introspection as a way of measuring 
properties of experience is far from straightforward (Feest 2012a, b). She argues 
2 Evaluating whether a measure is reliable requires identifying conditions under which the target phe-
nomenon is in the same state, in order to repeatedly measure it. This is not always straightforward, and 
often relies on some basic theoretical assumptions about the target phenomenon, so is not an entirely 
independent or direct way of assessing the measure. This is potentially problematic for investigations of 
experience: we do not know which factors to control for when attempting to generate similar/same expe-
riences.
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that we in fact need to know rather a lot about introspection in order to use 
introspective reports, based in part on disanalogies between introspection and 
standard assumptions or techniques used in developing measurement methods. 
For example, compared to the use of standard instrumentation, there are still 
ongoing debates about what exactly counts as introspection (e.g. compared to 
perceptual reports), and whether the process of introspecting affects phenomenal 
states and whether this affects the validity of introspective reports (see discus-
sion in Sect. 2). Feest also argues that we need to have a firmer grasp of exactly 
what the research questions are that are to be addressed by introspective data, as 
this will naturally affect experimental procedures and interpretive frameworks. 
Given this, she argues that forward progress must be made on a case by case 
basis, where “…our understanding of the status/meaning of introspective data 
co-evolves with our understanding of the ways in which they are generated…” 
(Feest 2012a, p. 13).
This co-evolution of theory and measurement fits well with Chang’s claim of 
the necessity of using a coherentist approach in the development of measure-
ment techniques (see esp. Chang 2004, pp. 220–234). Measurement devices and 
protocols, calibration techniques, and interpretive frameworks ultimately rely 
on theory about the phenomenon being measured, and theories about phenom-
ena are developed from the very same measurements (as well as other sources 
of empirical evidence). Progress proceeds by indirectly testing and building on 
assumptions, broadening the scope of and adding detail to both measurement 
procedures and theory, and identifying and correcting errors, by relying on 
coherence as a (defeasible) marker of progress.
The rest of the paper unpacks the further potential of this approach, in par-
ticular where the framework of measurement can be used to identify and charac-
terize methodological problems that might otherwise be missed.
4  A ‘Bottom‑Up’ Approach
One way to analyse the potential evidentiary role of introspective reports is to 
see whether general processes of developing measurement procedures can be 
applied to them, and if so, what the evidential value of the ensuing reports are. 
The process analysed in this section is from Chang’s (2004) work on measur-
ing temperature, which provides a kind of ‘bottom-up’ approach to developing a 
scale of measurement. It is ‘bottom-up’ in the sense that it uses local coherentist 
strategies of fixing and testing constraints, making it possible to slowly expand 
the scope of the measurement procedure. This is in contrast to the explicitly 
comparative, cross-validation approaches considered later. While Chang notes 
that this pattern of development of a measurement procedure may not generalise, 
it provides a place to start, and as below, usefully identifies two core methodo-
logical problems related to the use of introspective reports about consciousness.
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4.1  Developing Measurement Systems
As a very rough summary, there are four stages in the development of measure-
ments of temperature (Chang 2004). First, there were thermoscopes, which indicate 
when one thing is hotter than another, but do not for example indicate how much 
hotter. Second, to allow comparisons across instruments, stable fixed points were 
identified and precisely specified (e.g. 0 and 100 Celsius as the boiling and freezing 
points of water under specific conditions), and instruments were calibrated to these 
fixed points. Third, it was established how the scale in the measuring instruments is 
related to temperature between the fixed points. For example, the expansion of mer-
cury in a thermometer may not be linear as temperature increases, so a mark half-
way between 0 and 100 °C on a mercury thermometer may not indicate a tempera-
ture of 50 degrees. Fourth, the measurement scale was expanded outwards beyond 
the fixed points, including how to measure temperature when standard thermometers 
freeze or melt.
Two important ontological assumptions underpin this process. The first is real-
ism: it is assumed that temperature is a feature of the world, and is not a theoretical 
or experimental construct. The second is the Principle of Single Value: it is assumed 
that the property being measured has exactly one value at a time.
Both of these assumptions seem warranted when trying to measure temperature; 
it seems entirely reasonable to think that temperature is not a construct and things 
only have one temperature at a time. However, the Principle of Single Value is cru-
cial not just as a starting assumption, but also to the practice of using reliability as 
a guide to problems with the validity or accuracy of a measure. In Fig. 1, there is 
precisely one bullseye on each diagram, which is equivalent to the Principle of Sin-
gle Value. This makes it possible to claim that if repeated measures do not cluster 
together then the measure is either invalid or inaccurate, and so revisions must be 
made to the measurement procedure. However, without the assumption of the Prin-
ciple of Single Value, it cannot be assumed that there is exactly one bullseye. If this 
is the case, then a lack of clustering means nothing: it is consistent with either hav-
ing a measure that is wildly invalid or inaccurate (if the property does in fact only 
take one value at a time), or with having a perfectly valid and accurate measure (if 
the property takes multiple values at the same time).
4.2  Application to Introspective Reports
This section uses a fairly well known example to test whether something like this 
process of measurement development can work for properties of consciousness. 
This example is of introspective ratings of the ‘clarity’ of an experience, similar 
to subjective ratings of the ‘visibility’ of a stimulus. For example, Overgaard et al. 
(2006b; see also Ramsøy and Overgaard 2004) instructed participants to generate 
their own phenomenal categories of visual clarity, with associated verbal descrip-
tions, in a training session, which were later integrated to form a standard ‘Percep-
tual Awareness Scale’ used in experimental studies (for reviews see Sandberg et al. 
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2010; Timmermans and Cleeremans 2015). Other researchers (e.g. Del Cul et  al. 
2007; Sergent and Dehaene 2004) regularly use similar subjective ‘visibility’ ratings 
to identify the presence or absence of conscious perception for subjects, and through 
this identify neural mechanisms for consciousness.
The use of these kinds of introspective reports is fairly widespread, and they have 
the potential for identifying the boundaries and features of conscious perception in 
a way that goes beyond standard and more ‘behaviouristic’ psychophysical meas-
ures. They are therefore an example of the more exciting and potentially revolu-
tionary kinds of introspective reports that might help resolve long-standing debates 
about the nature and boundaries of consciousness. In trying to replace behavioural 
measures of consciousness, and in trying to use much of the same methodologi-
cal machinery as these existing measures, they also easily fit under the umbrella of 
measurement. The question is then whether these rating scales can in fact be devel-
oped and validated within standard measurement procedures.
First, it seems reasonable to assume that introspectors are capable of thermo-
scope type measures, at least under normal conditions. That is, introspective agents 
are capable of telling, with a reasonable degree of validity and accuracy, when one 
experience is more clear than another, or when one stimulus is more visible than 
another. There might be some problems with this claim, but grant it for now.
The second stage is to identify fixed points, which makes it possible to calibrate 
different measuring instruments (e.g. different introspecting agents) to these anchor 
points. Fixed points in introspective scales would be incredibly useful, as for exam-
ple a fixed point of having no clarity of experience, or no stimulus visibility, could 
be used as an indication of a lack of a conscious visual experience of a stimulus. 
This could then be used to delineate the boundary between conscious and uncon-
scious perception. Indeed, this is the primary use of these introspective rating scales: 
to challenge and provide alternatives to theories of conscious perception that are 
based on more ‘behavioural’ measures (i.e. as is used in Ramsøy and Overgaard 
2004; Del Cul et al. 2007; Sergent and Dehaene 2004).
However, fixed points cause problems when it comes to introspective scales 
like clarity. This is because these introspective judgements are tied to the task or 
broader context they are made within. As it turns out, how ‘clear’ you rate an experi-
ence depends on what you need to do with it. An experience that is clear enough to 
ground a simple response can be rated as having high clarity. However, if the same 
experience3 is not clear enough to ground a more complex response, it will now be 
rated as having low clarity.
This idea is illustrated in more detail with the toy example in Fig. 2 (adapted from 
psychophysical research). In the first task (on the left), you the participant are shown 
a series of images on a screen, for 50 ms each, with a short break in between each 
image. Sometimes the screen shows a triangle as a stimulus, but sometimes it is a 
blank screen (no stimulus, marked by square brackets). Immediately after the pres-
entation of each image you are asked two questions. The first question is a detection 
3 It is somewhat problematic to talk about ‘the same experience’; it should be taken to mean an experi-
ence with the same (or very similar) phenomenal properties as another.
 E. Irvine 
1 3
question: was there a stimulus present (yes/no). The second is an introspective ques-
tion: how clear was your experience of the stimulus (e.g. a clarity rating on a scale 
of 1–5).
With practice at this task, you can get fairly good at correctly answering the 
detection question. In this case it seems likely that you will give high clarity ratings 
about the experiences that allow you to successfully detect the stimuli, and you will 
be fairly confident in your answers.
In the second task (on the right), the set-up is basically the same. However, this 
time you are shown images of either a triangle or a square, and are now asked an 
identification question before giving a clarity rating. Identification questions are 
harder to answer correctly than detection questions, so even with practice your 
performance may not be good, and you will likely not be very confident in your 
answers. In this case you are likely to give lower clarity ratings for the experiences 
that support this lower level of performance.
Here is the problem: across these two simple tasks, you will give two differ-
ent clarity ratings for the same stimulus (50 ms presentation of a triangle). On the 
assumption that the same stimulus will generate the same experience, you will 
therefore generate two different clarity ratings for the same experience, depending 
on what task you are currently performing.
Importantly, the results in this toy example are grounded in solid experimental 
work. In particular, confidence ratings tend to track task performance and task dif-
ficulty (Haase and Fisk 2001; Hertzman 1937; Nickerson and McGoldrick 1963; 
Sandberg et al. 2010) and clarity ratings track confidence. For example, when sub-
jects in (Ramsøy and Overgaard 2004, see p. 12) generated verbal descriptions for 
Fig. 2  Two different tasks using clarity ratings. See text for full explanation
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categories of visual clarity, different discrimination abilities and confidence levels 
featured heavily. The category of ‘no experience’ was defined as ‘no impression of 
the stimulus is experienced. All answers are experienced as mere guessing’, suggest-
ing a lack of discrimination ability and no confidence in the participants’ responses. 
The category of ‘almost clear experience’ was defined as the ‘feeling of having seen 
the stimulus, but being only somewhat sure about it’, here explicitly about having 
mid-level confidence in detection tasks. Even more specifically, Wierzchon et  al. 
(2014) found that participants’ responses about their awareness of stimuli using a 
variety of subjective rating scales were affected by responses they gave in identifica-
tion tasks (see also Sandberg et al. 2010).
Importantly, this is true even for extreme points on a scale of clarity ratings. It is 
well known that for subjective reports, which include introspective reports, a range 
of factors affect when subjects report having ‘no experience’ of a stimulus, includ-
ing task type, structure, difficulty, and motivation. As Timmermans and Cleeremans 
(2015) note: “One cannot emphasize enough how apparently small differences in 
procedures may lead one to strikingly different conclusions when it comes to distin-
guishing between conscious and unconscious cognition” (p. 41). This means that for 
two participants shown exactly the same set of stimuli, but doing different tasks, or 
paid differently, the instances under which they report having ‘no experience’ can be 
radically different (again see King and Dehaene 2014; Swets and Green 1966; Irvine 
2009, 2012a, b).
Here then clarity ratings track task difficulty (detection vs. identification), task 
performance and confidence. This means that even if it is possible to set up fairly 
stable and shared fixed points within a specific task, these fixed points are not trans-
ferable across tasks. An experience of a triangle in an easy task can get a high clar-
ity rating, but change the task difficulty and the (plausibly) same experience is now 
given a low clarity rating. The phenomenal properties of the same experience can be 
rated differently depending on the task at hand.
In sum, phenomenal properties like clarity and visibility are partly defined by, or 
are at any rate deeply sensitive to, features of task and context. This makes it impos-
sible to generate task- and context-independent fixed points for phenomenological 
properties like clarity. But this is precisely what is needed to move beyond using 
simple thermoscope-type judgements, and to enable comparisons of introspective 
reports of phenomenal properties across instruments, measurements, and tasks.
One possible response is to accept that what subjects take phenomenal proper-
ties like clarity or visibility to mean vary task to task, and claim that this at least 
doesn’t prevent us from investigating these various interpretations of these phenom-
enal properties. This, I think, is to just accept and ignore the problem though. As 
evidenced in the quotation from Timmermans and Cleeremans above, “apparently 
small differences in procedures” can generate very different interpretations of what 
phenomenal properties like clarity or visibility mean. If we cannot meaningfully 
compare introspective reports about phenomenal clarity, or subjective visibility, 
across even small differences in experimental procedures, then it is not clear that 
these concepts are doing any work in picking out interesting and stable properties of 
experience in the first place. In particular, if introspective reports of visibility genu-
inely pick out different properties of experience across very similar tasks, then it is 
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far from clear what use they can be in identifying the boundaries of conscious per-
ception. Yet this is exactly what introspective reports about this phenomenal prop-
erty is supposed to help us do.
Importantly, this point generalises. Any introspective reports that require some 
degree of comparison to other stimuli (either present or from memory), oor that are 
related to confidence ratings, or that enable different kinds of actions with greater 
or lesser likelihood of success, will be strongly modulated by the conditions under 
which they are made. It is hard to think of an introspective response that does not 
have one or more of these features: responses concerning the properties of a stimu-
lus (colour, shape, duration, presence/absence), and responses concerning perhaps 
more elusive properties of experiences themselves (blurriness, clarity, richness, 
intensity), will all be affected. This strongly suggests that there it is not possible to 
find fixed points across many (if not all) kinds of introspective response. This further 
means that many (if not all) kinds of introspective reports cannot therefore move 
beyond stage 1 of the process of generating systems of measurement outlined above. 
At least one way to develop scientifically rigorous introspective measurements is out 
of bounds.4
4.3  Ontological Assumptions
There is a further problem though which runs even deeper, and applies more 
broadly, related to the ontological assumptions mentioned earlier. For temperature 
and many other phenomena, making the assumptions of realism and the Principle of 
Single Value are fairly straightforward. However, for properties of experience things 
get a bit more complicated.
In particular, it is not clear whether the Principle of Single Value (PSV) is really 
a safe assumption to make when it comes to properties of experience.5 It is not out-
landish to think that a property of experience might sometimes have multiple val-
ues, be indeterminate, or have no value at all. As explained in Sect. 4.1, an inability 
to apply the Principle of Single Value would mean that reliability or unreliability 
would be useless as a way of assessing a measurement procedure.
Indeed, whether or not the PSV can be made in certain cases is up for debate. 
For example, Schwitzgebel (2002a) notes that participants are often highly uncertain 
about features of their experiences when engaging in mental imagery. They might 
claim, for example, that they just don’t know whether a mental image is in colour 
or in black and white, or how many windows an imagined house has. Schwitzge-
bel uses this as evidence towards a broad skepticism about epistemic claims based 
on introspection, but it might also show that some phenomenal properties are not 
determinate.
5 The assumption of realism is also potentially problematic, if the new ‘illusionists’ are to be believed 
(e.g. Frankish 2016).
4 Some interesting progress has been made on combining objective (bias-free) and subjective measures 
(Maniscalco and Lau 2012) but the resulting measures are not strictly introspective, and are usually asso-
ciated more with measuring metacognitive abilities than (first order) experience.
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Further, Hohwy (2011) claims that introspective uncertainty is to be expected 
with some cases of introspection on mental imagery. Hohwy argues that mental 
imagery is usually tightly constrained and goal-oriented, which ensures that salient 
features of the mental images are fixed. However, when used for introspective tasks, 
mental imagery is usually open-ended. In this case it is not surprising that various 
features of the mental image are not fixed, and so do not take exactly one value. This 
provides both a good reason to drop the PSV in this case, and explains the source of 
introspective uncertainty.
Note though the strategy used to decide whether or not the PSV can be taken 
to hold in the case of mental imagery, and so how much weight to place on the 
variability of subjects’ reports about it. Here, Hohwy draws on evidence that is inde-
pendent of introspective reports to suggest that introspective experiences of men-
tal imagery really are uncertain, which explains why people are often uncertain in 
reporting about them. That is, behavioural evidence or cognitive frameworks are 
used to describe what experience is like (i.e. uncertain), which then explains away 
the unreliability and uncertainty found across a certain set of introspective reports. 
This then is an example where the status of introspective reports is directly evalu-
ated by checking their contents (uncertainty) against more trusted sources of evi-
dence (theoretical descriptions of the cognitive process of mental imagery). This is 
an initial clue about the evidential dependence of introspective evidence, discussed 
in more depth below.
For now though, note two methodological problems related to introspective 
reports that stem from considering this ‘bottom-up’ approach to developing meas-
urement procedures. First, there are no task-independent fixed points for introspec-
tive rating scales related to properties of experience like clarity and visibility, and 
(plausibly) for other kinds of introspective responses too. This prevents introspective 
agents from moving beyond thermoscope type outputs, and prevents comparison of 
introspective reports across tasks and contexts. Second, it is far from clear when the 
Principle of Single Value actually holds with respect to properties of experience. If 
this is true, then researchers cannot rely on the reliability (repeatability) of a meas-
ure to tell them anything about the validity or accuracy of introspective reports. Fur-
ther, in order to identify when the PSV holds, researchers are often forced to develop 
cognitive theories based on non-introspective evidence to suggest what experience 
is actually like in the case in question. If we can develop theories of phenomenal 
properties in this way though, in order to explain away introspective variability or 
uncertainty, then the justificatory role of these introspective reports is left obscure.
5  A Comparative Approach: Cross Validation of Measurement 
Procedures
It looks like the ‘bottom-up’ approach to developing introspective measures 
is unlikely to work, but there are of course other ways to develop and validate 
measurement procedures. One of the most common ways to do this in the cogni-
tive sciences is to use cross-validation. Here, the outputs of a range of independ-
ent measurement procedures are compared with each other. If the results they 
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generate cohere with each other, then this is reason to think that each of these 
measurement procedures is valid (probes the target phenomenon/property) and 
provides accurate measurements (gets very close to the real value of the target 
property). This is because it is more likely that each of the procedures is valid 
and accurate rather than that each procedure is invalid and inaccurate, but gen-
erates the same results by chance. The more procedures that cohere with each 
other, the more likely it is that each is a valid (and accurate) one. The key reason 
for doing this is not just to test the validity and accuracy of a procedure in the 
particular cases in which cross-validation is attempted. It is instead used as a 
way of validating a procedure in general, such that it can be used across novel 
contexts, where researchers can be confident that the validity and accuracy of 
the procedure still holds.
However, while comparative approaches are used very broadly in conscious-
ness science, it is not always clear if they are aimed at validating introspec-
tive procedures themselves, or aimed at validating specific sets of introspective 
reports. For example, comparative approaches are regularly used to assess dif-
ferent measures of consciousness (Sandberg et  al. 2010; Seth et  al. 2008), and 
introspective reports tend to be compared with ‘external performance criteria’ 
like other behaviours, neurophysiological data, or more ‘objective’ kinds of 
reports, in order to gauge the accuracy of each. However, these exercises are 
not usually explicitly aimed at validating introspective procedures per se. Simi-
larly, Jack and Roepstorff (2002) suggest a method of ‘triangulation’ comparing 
introspective reports, other behavioural data, and neurophysiological evidence to 
better understand features of consciousness. Within the neurophenomenological 
approach this process is referred to as ‘mutual circulation’ (for early proposal 
see Varela 1996). Again though it is not explicitly aimed at generating valid pro-
cedures for eliciting introspective reports across a range of tasks, but rather at 
validating a particular set of introspective reports.
Nevertheless, some comparative approaches can be seen in this light, particu-
larly when different procedures for introspective reports are compared with each 
other (e.g. as in Sandberg et  al. 2010). Here, the aim was to identify the dif-
ferences between the procedures and to come to some conclusion about which 
was better (more valid and accurate). In general, one might also argue that using 
cross-validation is key in introducing any new procedure for generating intro-
spective reports, combined with any theoretical justification for it that can be 
provided.
Despite the potential power of the cross-validation approach towards intro-
spective procedures, I will argue that there are significant problems that affect 
both stages of its application: the first stage requiring the development of an 
introspective procedure that generates evidence that coheres with non-intro-
spective evidence, and second inferring that the procedure is valid and so can 
be confidently applied in new contexts. Wide (if implicit) recognition of these 
problems probably also explains why such an approach is not more widely used. 
The slightly different method of using cross-validation for validating sets of 
introspective reports (rather than procedures) is discussed in Sect. 6.
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5.1  Stage One
The first stage in a cross-validating an introspective procedure is to develop one such 
that it generates evidence that coheres with non-introspective evidence, for a small 
set of calibration cases or experimental paradigms. One might think that the prob-
lem is that it is hard to develop introspective procedure that do this. However, given 
the sensitivity of introspective reports to a wide range of factors, this part is rela-
tively easy: via introspective training it is possible to manipulate subjects’ reports in 
a variety of ways, such that they cohere with sets of non-introspective evidence.
The problem is instead what the relevant non-introspective evidence is, such that 
introspective reports should cohere with it. There are a wealth of theories and related 
behavioural and neurophysiological ways of probing consciousness, all of which 
typically diverge, and as discussed above, sometimes quite dramatically (see also 
Timmermans and Cleeremans 2015; Irvine 2012a, b; Seth et al. 2008). For example, 
according to some measures and theories, consciousness is definitely present under 
some specific conditions, is always marked by the presence of feedback activity in 
the brain, and/or that all experiences are accompanied by phenomenal self-aware-
ness. Other measures and theories say the exact opposite. It is possible to get subjec-
tive visibility ratings to cohere with ‘objective’ measures of consciousness which 
measure core discrimination capacity (e.g. Dehaene and Changeux 2011, p. 201), 
using substantial training on highly artificial tasks. However, this commits one to 
the controversial claim that objective measures of consciousness are genuinely only 
picking out instances of consciousness, such that introspective reports that cohere 
with them do the same.6
Picking a set of non-introspective evidence or a set of theoretical predictions that 
introspective procedures should cohere with is therefore to make a significant theo-
retical commitment about the nature of experience and how to (non-introspectively) 
probe it. If the aim of using introspective reports is to help resolve these debates by 
providing (relatively independent) justificatory evidence, this shows that they can-
not do so when using this methodology. One must already pick a side in order to 
validate the introspective reports themselves, in which case they lend no justificatory 
support.
5.2  Stage 2
Second, there are problems in making the inference that an introspective procedure 
that (apparently) generates valid and accurate reports in one context will continue to 
do so in another. As illustrated in Sect. 4.2, many of the factors that affect introspec-
tive reports are task specific. The history of psychophysical research on the factors 
that affect subjective reports about even simple aspects of visual experience sug-
gests that these factors are high in number, that they interact, and that introspective 
reports can be very sensitive to small changes in them. Given the complexity of the 




introspective process, it is likely that an introspective procedure that ‘works’ across 
one set of tasks in one group of individuals is unlikely to work elsewhere.
In evaluating whether there is likely to be a single process of introspection (and if 
so, what it is), Schwitzgebel (2012) makes a similar point. He writes that:
What we have…is a cognitive confluence of crazy spaghetti, with aspects of 
self-detection, self-shaping, self-fulfillment, spontaneous expression, priming 
and association, categorical assumptions, outward perception, memory, infer-
ence, hypothesis testing, bodily activity, and who only knows what else, all 
feeding into our judgments about current states of mind (p. 41).
So, if an introspective procedure generates results that cohere with other evidence 
across a particular set of tasks, this then suggests that appropriate context-specific 
controls have been deployed in those tasks (possibly to encourage/facilitate coher-
ence). But in order to use an introspective procedure more broadly, such that we 
would expect introspective reports to continue to cohere with non-introspective evi-
dence, we would have to identify and use a different set of context-specific exper-
imental controls, or develop some kind of interpretive framework to evaluate the 
responses generated.
The problem is that identifying and implementing controls or interpretive frame-
works across contexts is far from straightforward. This is particularly true given that 
the use of an introspective procedure often relies on (extensive) context-specific 
training that is tied to the measure or theoretical framework that it is being validated 
against. Other than going through the whole validation procedure anew each time an 
introspective procedure is used, it is really not clear how to proceed. This means that 
confidently deploying introspective procedures across new tasks and individuals is 
just not easy as might be claimed.
These two problems provide good reason to think that cross-validating introspec-
tive procedures is, at the very least, extremely difficult. And perhaps not surpris-
ingly, cross-validation of introspective procedures is not common. This seems to be 
largely based on an (implicit) recognition of the problems outlined here: that validat-
ing introspective procedures means making a commitment about the nature of con-
sciousness, and that successful introspective procedures are likely to be specific to 
certain kinds of tasks and unlikely to generalise. As a result, researchers instead tend 
to focus on much more local cross-validation of the outputs of introspective proce-
dures, rather than the procedures themselves. This is discussed below, in particular 
focussing on the evidentiary status of introspective reports within this methodology.
6  A Comparative Approach: Cross Validation of Evidence
Comparing and cross-validating introspective results with other behavioural data 
and neuropsychological evidence is common in consciousness science (see some 
of the comparative approaches outlined in Sect. 5), but here the focus is on vali-
dating sets of introspective evidence, rather than introspective procedures. The 
idea is that if introspective evidence coheres with non-introspective evidence then 
this is reason to think that each of the forms of evidence are valid and accurate. 
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This is because it is more likely that each of the sets of evidence are valid (relate 
to the target phenomenon/property) and accurate (get very close to the real value 
of the target property), rather than that the evidence is invalid and inaccurate, but 
matches through chance.
Similar problems arise with this approach, but with a different twist. One recur-
rent problem is what kind of non-introspective evidence should be used to compare 
introspective reports against. The problem is the same for the cross-validation of 
evidence as for the cross-validation of procedures as discussed in Sect.  5 above. 
But there is a further twist on it that is more visible here: what to do when sets 
of introspective and non-introspective evidence diverge, as they do fairly often. If 
introspective evidence coheres with or matches non-introspective evidence, then all 
is well, and all the evidence is validated. But if there are mis-matches there need to 
be pre-specified ways of moving forward; it is no good just reporting on differences 
and leaving it there. For cross-validation and comparative practices to be productive, 
they need detailed rules of engagement.
Crucially, when it comes to comparative approaches, these rules of engagement 
are often either missing or take a negative stance towards introspective reports. 
For example, in applying Jack and Roepstorff’s (2002) method of ‘triangulation’ to 
introspective reports, there is no guidance about what to do in cases of mis-match 
between introspective reports and other data. In both Seth et al.’s (2008) and Tim-
mermans and Cleeremans (2015) reviews of measures of consciousness, the strategy 
for moving forward is one of comparison and triangulation, but again with no sug-
gestions of exactly how this should work.
In contrast, Bayne and Spener (2010) explicitly claim that in cases of mis-match, 
introspective reports can be ignored; only successfully scaffolded introspective 
reports should be trusted. ‘Scaffolded’ introspective reports are those whose content 
matches the content of a similar (perceptual) report. For example, the introspective 
report ‘it looks like a red ball’ would only be trusted (i.e. taken to be valid and accu-
rate) if it could be scaffolded by a correct perceptual report like ‘there is a red ball’. 
For introspective reports that cannot be scaffolded in this way, like judgements about 
cognitive phenomenology, a degree of scepticism is warranted towards introspective 
reports (though see Spener 2015 for alternative).
This is echoed more formally in comparisons of different subjective and intro-
spective rating scales, where an objective behavioural baseline is used to assess how 
valid and accurate the subjective measures are. Roughly, objective measures of con-
sciousness measure a subject’s core discrimination capacity, which usually diverges 
from what is captured by subjective and introspective measures. All of these meas-
ures come with their own advantages and disadvantages (for review see Irvine 
2013), but one of the distinct advantages of objective measures is that they are stable 
across tasks and free from response bias.
As a result, giving objective measures evidential priority is fairly standard meth-
odology. Illustrative of this, Sandberg et al. (2010) state that they are “[g]oing with 
the tacit assumption that objective measures should be preferred over subjective (i.e. 
introspective) ones when studying consciousness” (p. 1077) in order to assess the 
merits of different subjective measures. That is, objective measures of conscious-
ness are ‘better’ than subjective and introspective measures, which are simply not 
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as sensitive and accurate. Objective measures form the benchmark for introspective 
reports to be judged against.
The problem here is (I think) fairly obvious: when there are instructions about 
what to do in cases of mis-match between introspective and non-introspective evi-
dence, cross-validation is done on the premise that introspective reports are eviden-
tially inferior to other measures. To be clear, this negative stance towards introspec-
tive reports is a fairly sensible position to take. The arguments in Sect. 3 show that 
there are a wealth of unpredictable factors that can affect the content of introspective 
reports, and the Argument from Variability provides a further reason to be sceptical 
of their value. In this case, if introspective reports are the odd ones out in a compara-
tive study, then it is reasonable to doubt the introspective evidence.
However, if non-introspective evidence is typically seen as having evidential 
superiority over introspective evidence, this entails that introspective reports have 
little or no independent justificatory status. First, in cases where introspective 
responses fails to fit with other evidence, introspective evidence is either ignored, 
assumed to be false, and/or form explananda in themselves. Obviously, in these 
cases, introspective evidence cannot play a strong justificatory role. Second, and 
based on this, in cases where the introspective evidence does fit with other evidence, 
it is not clear that it is particularly informative. That is, if introspective evidence is 
evidentially inferior, to the extent that it would be ignored if it did not fit with non-
introspective evidence, then it is not clear what it (evidentially) adds when it does 
fit. This is compounded in cases where it is not known in any amount of detail why 
the introspective evidence fits or not, and in cases where there is dubious introspec-
tive training which artificially forces a ‘fit’.
Together, this supports a strong and sceptical conclusion. The evidential value 
of introspective reports is deeply dependent on the evidential value of the non-
introspective data that they are validated against, where the choice of relevant non-
introspective data typically commits one to a significant theoretical stance regarding 
the nature of consciousness. Further, introspective evidence is only ‘trusted’ when 
it matches with non-introspective evidence, and ignored when it does not. Across 
all cases then, where introspective evidence either fits or does not fit with other evi-
dence, introspective reports are not in a position to play a strong justificatory role in 
consciousness science, and are distinctly incapable of resolving long-standing theo-
retical and empirical debates.
7  An Objection
There is an obvious objection to the arguments above, which is to just learn more 
about the process of introspection.7 If we knew more about how introspective reports 
are generated, we could gain more confidence in developing and applying introspec-
tive procedures, and so improve the evidentiary value of introspective reports to be 
at least as high, if not higher, than that of non-introspective evidence. In this case the 
7 Many thanks to Wayne Wu for pressing me on this.
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arguments provided above would apply to current uses of introspective evidence, but 
possibly not future uses. However, the points raised above can be used to defend a 
stronger claim: that introspective evidence is unlikely to ever play a strong justifica-
tory role in consciousness science. This can be illustrated by considering how such 
knowledge of introspection would be generated.
One approach would be to systematically study the generation of introspective 
reports in detail across a small range of tasks, identifying and manipulating factors 
to see how they change subjects’ introspective reports. In essence, this is already 
done within classical psychophysics. One could imagine taking a broader approach 
though and try to isolate and manipulate factors that are traditionally out of bounds 
of psychophysics, including the sorts of factors identified in Schwitzgebel (2012): 
these might include self-shaping or self-fulfilment, memory and association. Once 
these factors are mapped out, one might then be able to control for them experi-
mentally, or otherwise try to interpret introspective reports in light of them. This 
would not be easy: the number of factors that might be relevant, and how they affect 
introspective reports in isolation and in combination, is likely to be complex, to vary 
significantly across tasks, and also likely to vary across individuals (certainly for the 
more cognitive factors). At the very least, this will take a while.
However, this variability and complexity generates problems of its own. If dif-
ferent introspective agents generate different reports given the same stimuli, and are 
sensitive to small changes in experimental set ups, and sometimes even vary their 
own introspective reports about the same stimuli over time, then it is difficult to get 
started on mapping all this out. What is key is having something stable and reliable 
to work from. However, related to the ‘bottom-up’ approach to validation outlined 
in Sect. 4.2, this is usually absent when working with introspective reports alone. 
There are no phenomenal fixed points that introspective agents can be calibrated 
to such that they will give comparable introspective reports or ratings across tasks. 
And it is not even clear when one can assume the Principle of Single Value, that is, 
assume that some phenomenal property does indeed take a single value at a time. 
The massive variability in introspective reports, as seen in the Argument from Vari-
ability, makes it impossible to establish a stable baseline from which to construct a 
theory of introspection.
One very natural alternative strategy to take, and one is that is very common in 
consciousness science (and key in psychophysics), is to search for a stable baseline 
elsewhere, either from non-introspective measures of consciousness, or theoretical 
predictions on what consciousness is like in some particular case. On the assump-
tion that this stable baseline accurately identifies when conscious perception is pre-
sent or not, (and maybe some of its features in particular cases), researchers can 
then identify how to get subjects to generate valid and accurate introspective reports 
about these instances of consciousness. This may be done via precise manipula-
tions of subjects’ motivation, confidence, and by precisely wording task instructions. 
From here, one might be able to identify how, in detail, introspection works, by con-
sidering how it is affected by a barrage of different factors over different subjects.
This is to essentially to take a comparative strategy, but as seen from the 
above, comparative strategies do not work in introspection’s favour. The biggest 
challenge is to identify what the best baseline is. For research on the difference 
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between conscious and unconscious perception, this is often taken to be an objec-
tive measure of consciousness, and similar behavioural tests are used as baselines 
for other aspects of consciousness. But again, this is to make a significant (and 
controversial) theoretical commitment about the nature of consciousness (e.g. 
that objective measures are good measures of the presence/absence of conscious-
ness) before one has even started using introspective reports in a serious way.
Alternatively, one might take the predictions of a particular theoretical 
approach to provide a baseline. In the example of mental imagery earlier, there 
are introspective reports of phenomenal uncertainty, and a theoretical framework 
for understanding mental imagery. The framework predicts that mental imagery 
done under introspective conditions (i.e. not goal-driven) will generate uncer-
tainty about phenomenal content. If this theoretical framework is right, then it 
explains away the uncertainty in introspective reports, and identifies the factors 
that generated it.
Yet both of these proposed ‘solutions’ illustrate the same fundamental problem: 
that making significant progress on how to collect and interpret introspective reports 
already demands that researchers commit to some fairly substantive claims about 
when conscious experience is like. In order to get better at evaluating introspective 
reports about (for example) the presence or absence of consciousness, or the clarity 
of conscious experience under certain conditions, we actually have to have some 
idea of when consciousness is present or not, and how certain conditions affect how 
‘clear’ conscious experiences are. In order to get better at evaluating introspective 
reports about (for example) phenomenal uncertainty, blur, or other less obvious 
phenomenal features, we also have to have some idea of when and how they might 
occur, in order to rigorously evaluate introspective reports about them. That is, to 
engage with introspective reports will involve figuring out what experience is like 
based on more trustworthy kinds of evidence or (non-introspectively) well-tested 
theoretical frameworks, and from there, work backwards to identify the combina-
tions of factors that explain why certain individuals make the kinds of introspective 
reports they do.
The key point then is that having done all this, introspective reports about a par-
ticular kind of experience might be scientifically usable, but at that point they are 
unlikely to tell us anything new. In particular, they are unlikely to play a role in 
providing strong justificatory evidence for claims about features of experience that 
have already been characterised by non-introspective means, and by which these 
new introspective responses were validated. Echoing this, and rather unsurprisingly, 
Froese et al. (2011) state that “[w]e are not aware of…any ‘killer experiment’ which 
would conclusively demonstrate that [an introspective method] has led to a substan-
tial breakthrough in consciousness science” (Froese et al. 2011). The sections above 
explain why this is so. Introspective reports are so variable and their production is so 
complex that a non-introspective stable baseline of some kind is needed in order to 
evaluate them. But identifying a relevant baseline comes with problems and signifi-
cant theoretical commitments of its own, and having chosen one in sufficient detail 
to engage in a validation process already answers the questions that introspective 
reports were supposed to help solve. In this case, due to basic methodological con-
straints, introspective reports themselves currently cannot and arguably will not play 
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a strong justificatory role in consciousness science, particularly in resolving the kind 
of long-standing debates where new forms of evidence would be most valuable.
8  Conclusion
In this paper I have argued that it is very unlikely, for basic methodological reasons, 
that introspective reports can play a strong justificatory role in consciousness sci-
ence now, or in the future.
First, a ‘bottom-up’ non-comparative approach to validation does not take one 
very far. Constructing a measurement scale for introspective ratings runs into the 
problem of no fixed points: ratings about phenomenal properties of experience are 
massively context sensitive, so fixed points cannot be sustained across contexts. 
Using reliability as a defeasible marker of accuracy and validity requires the Prin-
ciple of Single Value, which cannot always be assumed for phenomenal properties. 
This means that it is not possible to validate, in a bottom-up way, these kinds of 
introspective procedures such that they are guaranteed to work outside the narrow 
range of tasks and subjects where they have initially been (apparently) successful.
Second, cross-validation of introspective procedures runs into several recurring 
methodological dead ends. One is how to identify the relevant non-introspective 
measurement procedures that introspective procedures should be expected to cohere 
with. Any decision here is liable to be controversial. Another is that, as above, given 
the sensitivity of introspective reports to a range of factors, one is not warranted 
in making the inference that an introspective procedure that (apparently) generates 
valid and accurate reports in one context will continue to do so in another. If this 
inference cannot be sustained, then there is no value to trying to cross-validate intro-
spective procedures (which may explain why it is rarely attempted).
Third, cross-validation of sets of introspective evidence is more common, but also 
runs into some of the same dead-ends. Again, it is not straightforward to identify the 
relevant non-introspective evidence to compare introspective reports to. It is also 
usually left unclear how to proceed when introspective evidence fails to cohere with 
the relevant non-introspective evidence. When it is made clear (though often only 
implicitly), the standard approach is to treat introspective evidence as being less 
trustworthy than non-introspective evidence. If introspective reports fit with what 
we already know from other methods then we accept them (but learn nothing new), 
and if they don’t fit, then we ignore them, assume them to be incorrect and/or treat 
them as explananda in their own right. This means that whether or not introspective 
evidence coheres with non-introspective evidence, its evidential value is dependent 
on the value of the non-introspective evidence that it is validated against. In this case 
cross-validation offers no easy way out, and introspective reports end up with little 
justificatory power of their own.
Finally, the complexity of introspective processes ensures that this state of affairs 
will continue. Identifying how different groups of factors affect introspective reports 
across individuals, tasks and contexts well enough to interpret introspective reports 
in a scientifically rigorous way will likely be incredibly complicated. To do this will 
involve working backwards from ‘simpler’ and more trusted forms of evidence and 
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theoretical frameworks about what experience is like. At this point though, intro-
spective data will add little of justificatory value; we will already know the answers 
that introspective data was supposed to provide.
However, introspective reports clearly do have an important set of roles to play 
in consciousness science and cognitive science more broadly. The very fact of intro-
spective unreliability, uncertainty, or inaccuracy in particular cases is highly inform-
ative. If for example participants are highly uncertain in their reports (as in the case 
of mental imagery), this can perhaps be combined with independent evidence to 
suggest that the Principle of Single Value does not in fact hold for various prop-
erties of experience in certain cases. Introspective inaccuracy can be used to shed 
light on the nature of introspection and on participants’ background beliefs about 
experience, and instances of introspective unreliability demand their own (often 
very local) explanations. Even if the nature of experience cannot be directly read off 
from the contents of introspective reports, it is still possible to learn about experi-
ence and the process of introspection by paying attention to higher level features 
(unreliability, uncertainty) of sets of introspective reports. Introspection will also 
obviously continue to play important and core roles in discovery, driving research 
questions and contributing to hypothesis generation. However, for the reasons dis-
cussed above, it is unlikely that introspective reports can ever play a strong justifica-
tory role in consciousness science, or help resolve long-standing debates about the 
nature of experience.
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